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The Second Great W ar was so extensive and of such intensity 
that it did not fail to influence our Modern Society in every phase 
of its existence. The field of Law was no exception to this influence. 
An interesting example of the W ar's impact in the field of Conflicts 
of Law mav be found in the case of Ken ward v. Kcnward (supra). This 
case dealt with a domiciled British subject, who while in the armed 
services met a domiciled Russian, the subsequent marriage taking place 
in Russia. Since the husband could not be re united with his Russian 
wife he sought a decree of nullity.
t his action was instituted along with three others of similar nature; 
they all sought decrees of nullitv of their Russian marriages with their 
Russian wives, contending that the marriages were invalid for want of 
form, or alternatively, were void for want of consent. The wives were 
not represented bv counsel, and as Joseph Jackson pointed out in his 
article (1951 Modern Law Review Vol. 14 No. 1 p. 84), “Cases of 
public concern should be dealt with bv Acts of Parliament. This would 
be fairer to the wives, as someone would have argued their ease, and 
the result would have been more conclusive.” Of the four cases 
Kcnward v. Kcnward was the onlv one that was definitely dismissed 
bv the Court of first instance.
The principle facts of this case arc as follows: Kcnward was 
serving with the Koval Navv at Archangel in 1945. In September 
of that year he met liis wife, Nina Nikolaevna, a Russian girl, who after 
a short while suggested marriage to which he agreed. After main 
attempts, Nina finally got an appointment with the local registrar, 
and through an interpreter the marriage was effected October 16, 1945. 
Kcnward did not remember signing the register (but the Court con­
cluded that he had). Ilis passport was not stamped nor was he asked 
for a certificate relating to his health and previous marital status. 
Two clays after the marriage the husband was recalled to his ship, and 
never again saw his wife.
The first ground for the petition of nullity was that the formalities 
of the lex loci contractus were not adhered to. Hodson J. in the lower 
Court held that these infractions of form, such as the failing to 
stamp the appellant’s passport, and his not having a certificate stating 
liis previous marital status and the condition of his health as outlined 
by the Russian code, did not render the marriage invalid. Sir Ray­
mond Fvcrshcd M.R. concurred with Hodson J. that the infraction 
of the form did not go to the root of the contract. The determining 
factor for Hodson J. was section 2 of the Russian Code 1926, which 
stated that registration was sufficient proof of a valid marriage, despite 
the formalities not being complied with, and this marriage had to be 
tested bv Russian Law.
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The Master of the Rolls, Lord Kverslicd, disagreed with Ilodson J. 
011 the interpretation of section 2 of the Russian Code. 11c thought 
that the registration of the marriage was not indisputable as to its 
validity. W olff, the expert witness, had testified that this section 
would be set aside if the omissions went to the root of the contract. 
Lord Kverslicd held this as the main question—to decide the validity 
of the marriage, did the lack of form in this case go to the root of the 
contract? From the evidence he contended that it was clear that 
the Russian officials tried to discourage the Russian girl Nina from 
her marriage with Kcnward. and that it was onlv after repeated efforts 
011 her part that the officials finally relented. Kvcn so, thcv did not 
comply with all the forms. Another unusual fact was that the marriage 
ceremony wras held at night at Archangel.. Joseph Jackson in his 
article (supra) believes that the Russian officials never intended this 
to be a valid marriage — that they purposely left out part of the re­
quired forms of a valid marriage. 'These officials more than likely 
realized that Kcnward’s ship was sailing the next day.
Lord Kverslicd looked to the intention of the Soviet authorities 
and concluded that the subsequent legislation by the Soviet Govern­
ment in 1947—forbidding Russian spouses to leave Russia and forbidd­
ing their foreign spouses coming to Russia to join them — clcarlv 
illustrated the intention of the Soviet officials. But what if we look 
to the intention of the parties themselves? W ould this not tend 
to support the view of a valid marriage?
A point which was stressed more strenuously 111 the Court of 
Appeal conccrncd the invalidity of the marriage 011 the ground that 
it was not Christian. Section 9 of the Russian Code stated that it was 
not necessary for both parties to live together, thcv could choose 
their own profession. Living to gether is not a duty, but is based 
upon mutual arrangement or agreement of the parties. Nachimson 
v. Nachimson (1930) p. 217 did not support this view; Lord Kverslicd 
held it dealt with the simplicity of dissolution, and not the invalidity 
of a Russian marriage because of its lack of consortium. Knglish 
law stresses consortium, but basically a Russian marriage is 110 different 
from an Knglish marriage and thus this argument was rcjcctcd. Russ­
ian marriages arc not polygamous and thus do not violate the Christ­
ian principal of Vthc union of one man and woman....”
Lack of Consent was another ground raised to dissolve the marri­
age. Consent is based upon the personal law of the parties and not 
the personal law' of the place where the marriage is performed; this 
doctrine was laid clown in Apt v. Apt (1947) 2 A.K.R. 6“7. Kverslicd 
M.R. Ilodson I. and Buckuill 1 .J. all agreed that on Knglish law the 
husband’s consent was present.
It was further contended that there was a fundamental mistake 
which voided the contract. The belief that Russian authorities would 
continue to allow wives to leave Russia or permit their husbands to
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join them was a fundamental belief when the marriage was celebrated. 
I lie subsequent Russian legislation removed this contention and the 
appellant s counsel held that this mistake should void the contract. 
It was pointed out that this was a subsequent mistake and was not in 
existence at the time the contract was made. It is a fundamental 
rule of contracts that a subsequent mistake cannot void a previously 
made contract. A mistake of law will not void a contract, but a mis­
take of fact will. I his opens up an arbitrary point as it is difficult 
at times to distinguish law and fact.
T he point of Frustration was also raised by the appellant’s counsel 
as a further basis for voiding the marital contract. Tne contract was 
void through 110 fault of either party but as a conscaucnce of sub­
sequent Russian legislation. Lord Evershed who had already con­
cluded the contract invalid 011 formality did not officially deal with 
this point, deciding to leave it open for later judicial decisions dealing 
directly with the point. l ie  did however comment that this was 
a relatively new doctrine (Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S. 826) and 
had never been applied to marriage before. Ilodson J. in the court 
of first instance, briefly dealt with this point as it was not raised at the 
trial (but it was left open in the Court of Appeal). He said the con­
tract of marriage creates a status and the doctrine of frustration has 
no application.
Perhaps the judgment of Lord Justice Denning is the most in­
teresting in the case. He must be admired for meeting the problem 
head 011 rather than evading issues and leaving them for future decis­
ions. Although lie uses the term frustration, he doesn’t mean to 
app.h it 111 the strict sense of the doctrine. He assumed that if the 
marriage was formally valid, then it was voidable by English law bv 
reason of a condition which failed. Frustration implies the contract 
is voided at the moment the frustrating event occurs and not merely 
voidable as stated bv Denning L.J. Various statutes describe the con­
ditions for a valid marriage and new ideas such as Frustration cannot 
be applied. The Personal law of other countries may differ, and thus 
a condition attached to the law of one party may not apply to that of 
the other. If tliev have married accepting the particular condition 
as being fundamental, the marriage is then voidable if this condition 
is broken. I11 Re Bcthcll (1888) Ch. D. 220 supports the view that 
marriage depends 011 conditions attached to one party. If a person 
entering into a foreign marriage voluntarily adheres to its conditions 
it should be a binding marriage. The present marriage is voidable 
for failure of a condition that was fundamental and applicable; the 
belief that they would enjov subsequent consortium, nut Russian 
legislation thwarted this condition, thus the contract is voidable.
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This ease lias been criticised 011 the grounds that it is an example 
of English lawmakers bending backwards to stretch the law into 
giving a just decision. I am of the contran opinion that this is 
a strict interpretation of the law. llodson J. illustrates the attitude 
adopted bv the judiciary in interpreting this case. l ie  had great 
sympathy for the petitioner. Main lawvers will appreciate his refusal 
to stretch the law to a point where its extension becomes difficult 
or impossible to justify on existing provisions and principles. The 
Court of Appeal however developed the case a little more extensively 
than the court of first instance. I feci certain that the admirers of 
llodson J. will hold equal admiration for the Court of Appeal in the 
manner in which they arrived at their decision.
Donald J. O ’Brien, II Law U.N.B.
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